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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Skunkcap appeals from his convictions for eluding with a persistent 
violator enhancement, grand theft with a persistent violator enhancement, and 
misdemeanor convictions for malicious injury to property and assault. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
1. Docket No. 34746 
When officers tried to stop him at the scene of a narcotics surveillance, 
Skunkcap fled, striking two police cars with his own vehicle. (#34746 R., vol. I, 
pp. 19-23.) The state charged Skunkcap with felony eluding, malicious injury to 
property, possession of methamphetamine, grand theft by possession, and 
aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. (#34746 R., vol. I, pp. 78-80.) 
The state later amended to add an Information Part II charging an enhancement 
for being a persistent violator. (#34746 R., vol. I, pp. 146-48; voL, II, p. 220.) 
The case proceeded to trial where the jury acquitted Skunkcap of grant theft and 
possession of methamphetamine and convicted him for felony eluding, malicious 
injury to property (for hitting an officer's car a second time) and an included 
offense of misdemeanor simple assault. (#34746 R., vol. II, pp. 224-28.) 
Skunkcap thereafter entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement. 
(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 279.) 
After trial Skunkcap filed a motion to reduce the felony malicious injury to 
property conviction to a misdemeanor, which the district court granted on the 
basis that the evidence had not established the value of the damage to the 
1 
property caused by the second hit to the officer's car. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 
291-92, 295-300.) 
2. Docket No. 34747 
Skunkcap stole two saddles. (#34747 R, pp. 16-21.) The state charged 
him with grand theft. (#34747 R, pp. 48-49.) The state later charged a persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement. (#34747 R, pp. 149-52, 158-59.) The jury 
found Skunkcap guilty as charged, and he pled guilty to the persistent violator 
enhancement. (#34747 R, pp. 201-02.) 
3. Joint Sentencing and Appeal 
At a joint sentencing on both cases the district court imposed consecutive 
sentences of 18 years with eight years determinate on the enhanced eluding and 
grand theft convictions, respectively. (#34746 R, Vol. II, pp. 305-09; #34747 R, 
pp. 204-08.) The court imposed 6 months on the misdemeanor malicious injury 
to property and three months on the misdemeanor assault, and granted credit for 
time already served, fully executing both sentences. (#34746 R., Vol. II, p. 306.) 
Skunkcap filed timely notices of appeal from the district court's judgments 
in November of 2007. (#34746 R, Vol. II, pp. 313-15; #34747 R, pp. 209-11.) 
The record was settled July 18, 2008 and this Court ordered Skunkcap's brief 
filed by August 22,2008. (Supreme Court Notice (7/18/08).) 
4. Docket No. 38249 
On December 4, 2009, while the appeals in the other dockets were still 
pending, Skunkcap filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the sentencing 
enhancement entered in the eluding case, Bannock County Case No. CR-2006-
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20842-FE-C (Docket No. 34746), on the basis that the plea was not knowing and 
voluntary because the district court had misstated the penalty at a prior hearing. 
(#38249 R, pp. 1-20.) The court granted the motion. (#38249 R, pp. 24-25.) 
After securing Skunkcap a trial on the persistent violator enhancement, counsel 
for Skunkcap moved to withdraw on the basis that counsel had failed to correct 
the court's misstatement about the penalty associated with the persistent violator 
enhancement. (#38249 R, pp. 26-27.) The court denied the motion. (#38249 
R, pp. 28-29.) After a trial, the jury convicted Skunkcap of being a persistent 
violator. (#38249 R, pp. 107-12.) The court entered judgment on the persistent 
violator conviction, ordering a "subsequent indeterminate term of seven (7) 
years." (#38249 R, pp. 114-16 (capitalization altered and bolding omitted).) 
Skunkcap filed a notice of appeal from the new judgment. (#38249 R, pp. 122-
25.) 
Skunkcap also filed a Rule 35 motion claiming that the new sentence was 
illegal because the entire sentence was necessarily vacated upon granting the 
motion to withdraw the plea. (#38249 R, pp. 119-21.) The district court agreed, 
and then reinstated the original sentence. (#38249 R, pp. 134-35.) 
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ISSUES 
Skunkcap states the issues on appeal on page 25 of the Appellant's brief. 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. During deliberations the jury in docket number 34746 asked, in relation to 
the malicious injury to property count, whether it had to find that Skunkcap 
intended the damage. The district court referred the jury to the instruction 
containing the statutory definition of malice. Has Skunkcap failed to show 
that the district court erred by instructing the jury using the statutory 
definition of the word "maliciously"? 
2. During the trial on eluding the district court used a jury instruction that 
contained the statutory language that the signal to stop must be the sort of 
signal that a reasonable person would understand to be a signal to stop. 
Has Skunkcap failed to show fundamental error in the use of the statutory 
language? 
3. The district court used the jury instruction on the elements of assault 
submitted by Skunkcap. On appeal Skunkcap claims that the use of his 
instruction was fundamental error. Is his claim barred by the invited error 
doctrine? 
4. At the trial on the eluding charge a detective testified that he took 
"aggressive action" to box Skunkcap in after Skunkcap had already struck 
a police car because Skunkcap had demonstrated disregard for the safety 
of the officers and others. Has Skunkcap failed to show fundamental error 
in this testimony? 
5. The cumulative error doctrine applies only to preserved claims of error. 
Skunkcap asserts only one preserved claim of error in docket number 
34746. Is Skunkcap's claim of cumulative error inapplicable as a matter of 
law? 
6. When asked whether he was satisfied with the performance of his counsel 
in relation to entering a guilty plea to being a persistent violator Skunkcap 
stated certain dissatisfaction but did not request a substitution of counsel. 
Different counsel later moved to withdraw, but the district court denied that 
motion after rejecting its factual basis. Has Skunkcap failed to show that 
the district court had some sort of duty to conduct further factual inquiry 
into counsel's performance? 
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7. Evidence that Skunkcap refused to talk to police was admitted at the trial 
on the grand theft charge. Skunkcap claims on appeal that this was 
fundamental error. Although the evidence was improperly presented, has 
Skunkcap failed to show fundamental error where the evidence of 
Skunkcap's guilt is overwhelming and the jury was instructed to not hold 
the lack of a statement to police against Skunkcap? 
8. Skunkcap's Rule 35 motion claimed his sentence was illegal and also 
requested leniency. The record shows that the district court granted the 
part of the Rule 35 motion claiming an illegal sentence and denied only 
Skunkcap's request for leniency. Is Skunkcap's claim the district court 
erred by denying his claim of an illegal sentence without merit because it 
is based on incorrect reading of the record? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Skunkcap's Argument That The District Court Erred By Instructing The Jury 
Using The Statutory Definition Of The Word "Maliciously" Is Without Merit 
A. Introduction 
While attempting to elude other officers, Skunkcap rammed into Detective 
Collins' Ford Escape, which the detective had positioned across a road to block 
traffic from entering the area of the pursuit. (#34746 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 7-10; p. 82, L. 
20 - p. 85, L. 25; p. 172, L. 14 - p. 178, L. 4; p. 204, L. 10 - p. 211, L. 24.) 
Skunkcap then backed his car into a pursuing police truck driven by Sergeant 
Dalquist. (#34746 Tr., p. 86, Ls. 15-19; p. 178, Ls. 4-8; p. 178, L. 16 - p. 179, L. 
15; p. 211, L. 25 - p. 213, L. 14.) Skunkcap, boxed in but still trying to get away, 
drove forward and struck Detective Collins' car a second time. (#34746 Tr., p. 
86, L. 20 - p. 87, L. 2; p. 178, Ls. 8-10.) For this conduct the state charged 
Skunkcap with felony malicious injury to property. (#34746 R., vol. I, p. 79.) 
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of malicious injury to 
property. (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 246.) In "Instruction No. 17" the district court 
defined "maliciously" as "the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do 
a wrongful act." (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 247.) During deliberations the jury sent 
the court the following questions: 
Instruction 17, definition of maliciously. 
If the act (the second hit of the Collins vehicle) was done due to an 
effort to escape is that malicious?, [sic] or does it mean that the 
damage was the intent, not the escape. 
When committing a wrongful act is any unintentional damage 
considered malicious? 
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(#34746 R, vol. II, p. 281.) After hearing arguments from the parties (#34746 
Tr., p. 514, L. 4 - p. 522, L. 12), the district court instructed the jury that it should 
re-read the definition of "maliciously" already provided, but that they could 
differentiate between the different collisions in determining malice, and that if 
they determined that not all of the collisions were done maliciously they could so 
indicate on the verdict form (#34746 Tr., p. 522, L. 22 - p. 527, L. 2). The jury 
found Skunkcap guilty of malicious injury to property in relation to when he 
rammed Detective Collins' Ford Escape the second time. (#34746 R, vol. II, p. 
284.) Later the district court reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor because 
the state had not proved that this second collision had caused over $1000 in 
damage. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 291-92, 295-300.) The sentence for this 
conviction was six months already served. (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 306.) 
Skunkcap seeks reversal of his misdemeanor malicious injury to property 
conviction, arguing that the district court erred by failing to "properly instruct the 
jury that the mens rea of malice is specific to the intent to damage the property." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 27.) Skunkcap fails to acknowledge that the definition given 
the jury was straight out of the Idaho C,?de. Having failed to demonstrate that the 
legislature adopted an erroneous definition of malice, Skunkcap has failed to 
show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
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review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997). When 
this Court reviews jury instructions, it must first determine whether the 
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the 
applicable law. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). 
An instruction is not error unless it misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining 
party. kL. 
C. The District Court Did Not Err By Using The Statutory Definition Of 
Maliciously 
"Generally giving [a jury] instruction in statutory language is not error." 
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370,373,64 P.3d 296, 299 (2002). See also Holland 
v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728,730-731,518 P.2d 1190,1192-93 (1974) (holding that 
there was no error in the jury instructions when the trial court used, verbatim, the 
language from the statute). The definition of "maliciously" provided in the jury 
instructions was the same definition provided in the model instructions and the 
Idaho Code. (Compare #34746 R., vol. II, p. 247 with ICJI 1301, I.C. § 18-
101 (4).) Skunkcap fails to even acknowledge that the instruction he challenges 
was taken straight out of the applicable statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-31.) 
Because the jury was correctly instructed on the definition of "maliciously" as 
adopted by the Idaho Legislature, there was no error in the jury instructions. 
Even ignoring Skunkcap's failure to acknowledge that the language he 
challenges comes straight out of the applicable statute, Skunkcap's argument 
fails. The cases he primarily relies on addressed the distinction between merely 
negligent conduct and malice, an issue not presented in this case. They do not 
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support Skunkcap's argument that malicious injury to property requires specific 
intent instead of malice as the mental state element. 
In State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 862 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1993), Nastoff 
was operating an illegally modified chain saw which emitted hot carbon that 
smoldered for two days until it caught fire and burned five acres of timber. The 
court, after analyzing the statutory definition of malice, concluded that intent to do 
any wrongful act that happens to cause property damage is not enough, but that 
"culpability for malicious injury to property" lies "only where the defendant's 
conduct causing the injury is accompanied by an intent to injure property of 
another." Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 670, 862 P.2d at 1092. This reasoning was 
based on the basic law that there must be a union of act and intent, and therefore 
a defendant must have "harbored the intent to knowingly injure real or personal 
property." .!!L To hold otherwise would base guilt upon mere negligence . .!!L 
In State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 408, 958 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1998), Nunes 
was trying to steal gas, tried to break a lock to that end, but instead broke a valve 
on the tank, causing it to leak 250 gallons of gas and causing an ensuing 
cleanup. Nunes argued his case was controlled by Nastoff, but the Court of 
Appeals found that case "inapposite." .!!L at 409, 958 P.2d at 35. The court 
characterized the holding of Nastoff: "in using the term 'maliciously' in I.C. § 18-
7001, the legislature did not intend to proscribe and punish merely negligent 
conduct." .!!L Because Nunes did intend to damage the property at issue, even if 
he did not intend for the gasoline to spill, he was not merely negligent. .!!L at 409-
10,958 P.2d at 35-36. 
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Skunkcap claims that the lesson of these two cases is that "the State was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had the specific intent to 
injure or damage the cars with which he collided." (Appellant's brief, p. 28 
(emphasis added).) This is incorrect. Neither case talks about specific intent. 
Rather, both cases were merely interpreting I.C. § 18-101 (4)'s language defining 
malice, not re-writing it to require specific intent in lieu of malice. In addition, 
neither case even addressed the proper language of jury instructions, much less 
held that an instruction using the statutory language would be erroneous. The 
Nunes and Nastoff opinions, by their express terms, only distinguished between 
conduct that was merely negligent (Nastoff's chainsaw) and that which was 
intentional (Nunes' breaking of a gas tank). 
Here there was no reasonable view of the evidence indicating that 
Skunkcap did not act intentionally when he rammed the two stopped police cars. 
There is especially no reason to believe that the act for which he was convicted, 
ramming the stopped police car for a second time was merely negligent and not 
intentional. 1 Indeed, Skunkcap does not argue his conduct was reasonably 
viewed as merely negligent, but argues that he had to have the "specific intent" of 
property damage, apparently contending that the state had to prove his motive (if 
he rammed the car with intent of fleeing instead of causing damage then he 
would not be guilty), a proposition without any reasonable basis in law. The jury 
1 For this reason any error was also harmless. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 
669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010). Indeed, Skunkcap probably benefited from the 
court's instruction which did not preclude the jury from acquitting even if he 
intentionally rammed the police cars if his motive was to escape rather than 
cause damage to those cars. 
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was instructed using the statutory definition of "maliciously" and Skunkcap has 
neither argued nor demonstrated that such language was erroneous. 
II. 
Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Eluding Elements 
Instruction 
A. Introduction 
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of eluding, including 
the element that Skunkcap "[d]id willfully flee or attempt to elude a pursuing 
police vehicle" and that the eluding must be contemporaneous with "a visual or 
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop." (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245.) 
Between the enumerated elements and the instruction that the crime must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court included the following 
sentence: "** It is sufficient proof that a reasonable person who knew or should 
have known that the visual or audible signal given by a peace officer was 
intended to bring [the] pursued vehicle to a stop." (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245.) 
With the exception of the two asterisks and the bracketed word omitted from the 
instruction, this sentence is the same as found in the eluding statute, Idaho Code 
section 49-1404(1). Similar language appears in the model jury instruction on 
felony eluding, after the language about proving each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt. ICJI 1032 ("The signal to stop must be given by emergency 
lights or siren which a reasonable person knew or should have known was 
intended to bring the pursued vehicle to a stop."). Skunkcap did not object to this 
instruction. (#34746 Tr., p. 409, L. 9 - p. 411, L. 18.) 
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On appeal Skunkcap argues that the challenged sentence "relieved the 
State of its constitutional burden [of proving] beyond a reasonable doubt" that he 
willfully eluded the police by creating an impermissible "presumption ... that it is 
sufficient proof for the charged offense of felony eluding if the jury believes that a 
reasonable person knew or would have known that he or she was being signaled 
to stop" (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-35) and removing the state's burden of proving 
he "had some knowledge that he was being signaled to stop" (Appellant's brief, 
p. 38). This argument fails because Skunkcap's reading of the challenged 
instruction as modifying the requirement that the state prove he willfully eluded 
the police is patently unreasonable. The only reasonable reading of the 
instruction is that the challenged sentence related only to the element of a police 
signal to stop the vehicle, the exact element to which it pertained. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261 
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78 
(2010); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002). "An 
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as 
a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 
600-01 (2010». 
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C. Skunkcap Has Failed To Establish Any, Much Less All, Of The Elements 
Of Fundamental Error 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). See also 
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) ("An error 
generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal." (citations and 
internal quotations omitted)). This same principle applies to alleged errors in jury 
instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ("No party may assign as error the giving of or 
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party 
objects and the grounds of the objection."); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d 
at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Draper, 151 Idaho 
at 588, 261 P.3d at 365; State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 
(2010). 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Skunkcap to 
demonstrate that the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
that a jury instruction that relieves the state of its duty to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the crime charged violates the 
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defendant's right to due process. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 
(citing Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); State v. Anderson, 144 
Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007)). Skunkcap has, however, failed to 
establish a due process violation, much less the other elements of his 
fundamental error claim. 
The language Skunkcap challenges for the first time on appeal is identical 
to the language of the statute (with the exception of an omitted "the"). (Compare 
#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245 with I.C. § 49-1404(1)). It is similar to the language 
used in the model jury instruction. (Compare #34746 R., vol. II, p. 245 with ICJI 
1032.) Skunkcap provides no explanation whatsoever of how the same or similar 
language as used in the challenged instruction leads to a wildly different 
interpretation than would apply to the statute or the model instruction. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp. 31-38.) Skunkcap has failed to cite any case in which an 
instruction using the statutory language applicable to the crime has risen to a 
violation of due process. 
More importantly, Skunkcap's arguments simply do not withstand scrutiny. 
Skunkcap's argument that the language creates a presumption of guilt is directly 
contrary to the language of the instruction, after the elements and the challenged 
sentence, that "[i]f any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty." (#34746 R., vol. II, p. 245 
(emphasis added).) His claim that the jury did not have to find his conduct willful 
is directly contrary to the language of the instruction that the crime was to 
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"willfully flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle," which had to be 
proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. (emphasis added).) 
Read in its totality, the challenged instruction accomplishes the same thing 
as the statute and the model instruction using the statutory language. The 
instruction merely informed the jury that the signal used by the police needed to 
be the type of signal that a reasonable person would understand was intended to 
bring the pursued vehicle to a stop. No reasonable reading of the statute leads 
to the conclusion that the challenged language addressed, much less diminished, 
the state's burden of proving that the eluding or fleeing was willful. Skunkcap 
has failed to show error, much less constitutional error that is clear on the record 
and demonstrably prejudicial. 
III. 
Skunkcap's Claim Of Fundamental Error In The Jury Instruction On The 
Elements Of Assault Is Barred By The Invited Error Doctrine 
The district court gave the jury instruction on the elements of assault 
submitted by the defense. (Compare #34746 R., vol. II, p. 210 (instruction 
submitted by defense, checked "given") with p. 262 (instruction challenged on 
appeal).) On appeal Skunkcap contends the instruction he submitted to the 
district court, which the district court then used at trial, is fundamentally 
erroneous. (Appellant's brief, pp. 41-44.) Because it was the instruction 
Skunkcap asked the district court to use he is stopped from claiming its use was 
erroneous. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,187,254 P.3d 77,88 (Ct. App. 2011) 
("The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error 
when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error.") (citing State 
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v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,819,864 P.2d 654,657 (Ct. App. 1993». This issue 
should be rejected under the invited error doctrine. 
IV. 
Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Testimony Of Officer 
Dalguist 
A. Introduction 
During his testimony Officer Dalquist testified he took "aggressive action" 
to "pull right behind the suspect vehicle ... in an attempt to pin him in and keep 
him from going anywhere" because, after observing Skunkcap ram Detective 
Collins' car, he concluded Skunkcap did not "have any regard" for the safety of 
the officers "or anybody out on the street that day." (#34746 Tr., p. 211, L. 1 - p. 
212, L. 22.) Skunkcap did not object to this testimony_ (Id.) On appeal 
Skunkcap claims this testimony constituted prosecutorial misconduct amounting 
to fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 44-48.) Skunkcap's attempt to 
convert claims of evidentiary error at trial, which are by definition not viable 
claims of fundamental error, into claims of prosecutorial misconduct so that he 
can claim fundamental error should be rejected. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether an 
issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457,459,767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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C. Skunkcap Has Raised, At Most, A Claim Of Evidentiary Error And Has 
Therefore Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if the appellant 
establishes fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 
961,976 (2010); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011); 
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Review without 
objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or more of 
the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the 
constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any 
additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable 
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings." ~ 
at 225,245 P.3d at 977. Skunkcap has failed to meet his burden of showing any, 
much less all, of these elements. 
First, the error complained of is not constitutional. Even assuming the 
testimony in question was objectionable, mere presentation of inadmissible 
evidence is not a constitutional error. State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, _, 266 
P.3d 499, 508-509 (Ct. App. 2011) (inadmissibility of opinion testimony about the 
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truthfulness of other witnesses governed by rules of evidence, not Constitution); 
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 182, 254 P.3d 77, 83-84 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(concluding "the requirements set forth in I.R.E. 404(b), regarding admissibility 
and notice, are not of constitutional import" and noting prior cases rejecting 
claims that evidentiary error rises to the level of fundamental error). Even 
assuming the testimony was irrelevant (I.R.E. 401, 402) or unfairly prejudicial 
(I.R.E. 403) such states no more than a claim under Idaho's rules of evidence. 
Skunkcap argues that the testimony of the police officer "must be 
attributed to the State" and therefore the state attempted to secure a conviction 
by the prosecutorial misconduct of an "appeal to the jurors' fears." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 46.) Even ascribing the officer's challenged testimony to the state, 
however, does not elevate it from an evidentiary question to a constitutional 
violation. The constitutional question is whether the state "attempt[ed] to secure 
a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and 
the evidence admitted during triaL" Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979. 
The officer's mention that his motivation for taking aggressive action to box 
Skunkcap in was Skunkcap's apparent disregard for the safety of others, without 
more, simply does not rise to the level of the state attempting to secure a verdict 
on factors other than the defendant's guilt. The challenged testimony presents 
only an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional error. 
Even if the challenged testimony could reasonably be seen to raise a 
question of whether the state was attempting to secure a conviction on a basis 
other than Skunkcap's guilt, the answer to such question is not clear on the 
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record. Skunkcap makes no claim that the prosecutor mentioned the testimony 
in closing argument or that any other testimony on the subject was ever 
introduced. One isolated incident simply does not make clear that this was an 
unfair trial. See State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 367, 233 P.3d 1286, 1289 (Ct. 
App. 2010) ("A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect triaL"); Smith v. Phillips, 455 
U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (the "touchstone" of due process is the fairness of the trial). 
Likewise, the record does not establish that the isolated testimony in 
question did not draw an objection because of tactical choice. Indeed, the 
defense attorney could easily have concluded that the testimony was not so 
damaging as to merit an objection, or even that the testimony about the officer's 
reasons for taking certain actions at the time in question was not objectionable. 
Finally, Skunkcap has failed to show prejudice. Given the evidence that 
Skunkcap attempted to elude the police and struck two different cars a total of 
three times, the officer's opinion that Skunkcap was acting without regard to 
others' safety can hardly be characterized as overwhelmingly prejudicial. In 
addition, Skunkcap's argument that this Court can conclude that the jury's verdict 
was the product of prejudice because the jury acquitted him on many of the 
charges, either outright or finding him guilty on lesser offenses (Appellant's brief, 
p. 47), is illogical. 
To establish fundamental error Skunkcap has the burden of demonstrating 
constitutional error that is clear on the record (including that the lack of objection 
was not tactical) and prejudice. Skunkcap's claim of fundamental error related to 
Officer Oalquist's testimony fails on all three prongs. 
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V. 
Skunkcap's Claim Of Cumulative Error Is Meritless 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). The cumulative 
error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). Because any 
finding of fundamental error requires reversal without regard to cumulation, and 
because Skunkcap has raised on appeal only one preserved claim of error, by 
definition the cumulative error doctrine does not apply in this case. 
VI. 
Skunkcap's Claim That The District Court Had An Obligation To Inquire Into 
Alleged Conflicts Of Interests Is Meritless 
A. Introduction 
Skunkcap asserts that the district court failed to conduct an adequate 
inquiry into potential conflicts of interests between him and his trial attorneys. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 49-55.) Application of the correct legal standards to the 
complete facts shown by the record demonstrates this claim to be meritless 
because the district had no duty to conduct an inquiry. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon 
a showing of good cause; such decision lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712,714-715,52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002); 
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980). An abuse of 
discretion will only be found if the denial of such a motion results in the 
abridgment of the accused's right to counsel. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11, 
909 P.2d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 1995). 
C. The Complete Relevant Facts 
The state filed the complaint in docket number 34746 on November 15, 
2006, and public defender Randal Schulthies was appointed to represent 
Skunkcap that same day. (#34746 R., vol. I, p. 6.) Schulthies represented 
Skunkcap thereafter (#34746 R., vol. I, pp. 140, 142), including the jury trial 
(#34746 R., vol. II, p. 221), and the post-trial motion to reduce or for new trial 
(#34746 R., vol. II, pp. 293). The state filed the complaint in docket number 
34747 on November 30, 2006, and Schulthies was appointed to represent 
Skunkcap shortly after Skunkcap's arrest. (#34747 R., p. 6.) Schulthies 
represented Skunkcap thereafter (#34747 R., pp. 46,50,62, 158, 161, 165, 172 
("Kent V. Reynolds for Randall D. Schulthies")), including a jury trial ending in a 
mistrial when Schulthies was taken to the emergency room and unable to 
continue (#34747 R., pp. 177-83). 
Shortly after the mistrial in docket number 34747, on August 2, 2007, 
Schulthies moved to withdraw as counsel for Skunkcap in both cases on the 
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basis that Skunkcap had accused Schulthies of lying to him. (#34746 R, vol. II, 
pp. 301-02; #34747 R, pp. 184-85; #34746 Tr., p. 557, L. 7 - p. 558, L. 18; 
#34747 Tr., p. 204, L. 7 - p. 205, L. 18.) Skunkcap asserted that his accusations 
that Schulthies had lied to him were accurate, but he opposed the motion to 
withdraw. (#34746 Tr., p. 558, L. 20 - p. 562, L. 10; #34747 Tr., p. 205, L. 20 -
p. 209, L. 10.) Skunkcap stated, ''I'm satisfied with [Schulthies] with what he 
does, you know." (#34746 Tr., p. 561, Ls. 16-17; #34747 Tr., p.208, Ls. 16-17.) 
The district court nevertheless granted the motion because it would not be 
appropriate to "force" Schulthies to continue representation under the 
circumstances. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 303-04; #34747 R, pp. 186-87; #34746 
Tr., p. 565, Ls. 8-16; #34747 Tr., p. 212, Ls. 8-16.) The court appointed John 
Dewey and Randy Smith, also with the public defender's office, to represent 
Skunkcap going forward. (#34746 R, vol. II, pp. 303-04; #34747 R, pp. 186-87; 
#34746 Tr., p. 565, Ls. 8-16; #34747 Tr., p. 212, Ls. 8-16.) 
Dewey and Smith thereafter represented Skunkcap at the trial in docket 
number 34747. (#34747 R, pp. 195-203.) At the conclusion of the trial 
Skunkcap entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement. (#34747 
Tr., p. 468, L. 18 - p. 475, L. 18.) As part of the plea colloquy the district court 
asked Skunkcap if he had "problems with the way [his] attorney ha[d] 
represented [him]." (#34747 Tr., p. 471, Ls. 14-16.) Skunkcap claimed that 
Schulthies had been "trying to get off [his] case," had not shown up in court, that 
his speedy trial rights had been violated and that current counsel had spent only 
"two hours, total" with him in preparation for the trial just competed. (#34747 Tr., 
22 
p. 471, L. 17 - p. 472, L. 3.) Skunkcap concluded his comments, "That's alii got 
to say, sir. Thank you." (#34747 Tr., p. 472, Ls. 4-5.) 
It turns out that it was not all he had to say, however. At the conclusion of 
the hearing the court asked if Skunkcap had comments or questions and 
Skunkcap responded that he felt like "a lot of' his rights had been violated by 
Schulthies, and that his current counsel could not bring it up because they could 
not "slam their boss." (#34747 Tr., p. 476, L. 9 - p. 477, L. 1.) The district court 
reminded him that he had opposed Schulthies' motion to withdraw and had 
stated he was satisfied with Schulthies' representation. (#34747 Tr., p. 477, Ls. 
2~16.) Skunkcap agreed that he had wanted Schulthies' representation because 
he felt he was the best representation he was going to get as an indigent 
defendant, but still felt he was not "fairly defended," citing the two hours Dewy 
and Smith had spent with him preparing for trial. (#34747 Tr., p. 477, L. 17 - p. 
478, L. 9.) The court observed that he thought Dewey and Smith had done an 
"excellent job" in the trial and Skunkcap said, "Yes, they did." (#34747 Tr., p. 
478, Ls. 10-18.) 
After Skunkcap, through counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
to the persistent violator enhancement in docket number 34746 on the basis that 
the court had misstated the applicable penalty at the November 15, 2006 initial 
appearance (#38249 R., pp. 1-20), attorney Dewey moved to withdraw as 
counsel (#38249 R., pp. 26-27). The basis of the motion was that it was 
"theoretically possible that [Skunkcap] could allege that [Schulthies] should have 
corrected the misstatement of the law made by the Court" and that Dewey "works 
23 
for" Schulthies, creating a "direct conflict." (#38249 R., pp. 26-27.) The district 
court heard the motion to withdraw as counsel before taking up the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. (#38249 R., pp. 31-32; #38249 Tr. p. 12, Ls. 12-18.) 
Skunkcap was not present. (#38249 R., p. 31.) After hearing the 
representations of counsel,2 the district court denied the motion to withdraw as 
counsel on the basis that there was no conflict. (#38249 Tr., p. 12, L. 19 - p. 16, 
L. 2.) 
D. Application Of The Correct Legal Standards To The Facts Shows No Error 
The district court must conduct an inquiry into whether different counsel 
should be appointed in two circumstances. First, "[w]henever a trial court knows 
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has 
a duty of inquiry" to ensure that criminal defendants are not deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 347 (1980). Second, a court must also "conduct a meaningful inquiry" to 
determine whether a defendant's motion for substitute counsel is supported by 
good cause. State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 276 P.3d 756 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Neither of these circumstances applies in this case. 
2 Counsel clarified that the misstatement about the sentence by the court 
occurred at the initial appearance, so it was "unlikely that there was an attorney 
from the Public Defender's Office [appointed] at that time." (#38249 Tr. p. 13, Ls. 
5-15.) The transcript of the initial appearance held November 15, 2006 confirms 
that no attorney representing Skunkcap was present at that time. (See #34746 
11/15/06 Tr.) 
24 
First, Skunkcap never expressed a desire for substitute counsel. 
Skunkcap opposed Schulthies' motion to withdraw. He did make some 
complaints about Schulthies', Dewey's, and Smith's representation when 
specifically asked by the court about counsel's representation in a guilty plea 
colloquy, but never indicated any desire to substitute counsel. Skunkcap did not 
trigger the court's duty of inquiry by -requesting substitute counsel because he 
never requested substitute counsel. 
Second, there is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court knew, 
or should have known, that a particular conflict may have existed. Skunkcap 
never asserted "problems" with counsel that were as a result of a conflict of 
interests (as opposed to a general feeling that counsel was not being as diligent 
as Skunkcap would have liked). Likewise, Dewey's subsequent motion to 
withdraw was denied based on a specific factual finding, uncontested on appeal, 
that there was in fact no conflict of interests. 
Skunkcap assumes on appeal that the duty of inquiry is triggered 
whenever a defendant complains about his attorney. Such is not the law. To 
hold otherwise would represent a huge, and unjustified, expansion of the law. 
The duty to inquire is triggered only by a request for substitute counselor if the 
court has reason to believe a conflict of interests may exist. Here Skunkcap did 
not request substitute counsel (quite the opposite) and none of his complaints 
were of a conflict of interest (as opposed to generalized feelings his attorneys 
should have been more diligent). Skunkcap's challenge to the adequacy of the 
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inquiry thus fails because the duty to inquire was never triggered in the first 
place. 
VII. 
Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Admission Of 
Evidence That Skunkcap Did Not Give A Statement To Officers 
A. Introduction 
Lori Bowers, an employee of Vickers Western Store, saw Skunkcap 
putting a saddle in the trunk of a car. (#34747 Tr., p. 242, L. 1 - p. 247, L. 11; p. 
250, L. 15 - p. 252, L. 24.) The car was next to a trailer owned by Mr. Vickers, 
and the door of the trailer that was usually closed had been opened. (#34747 
Tr., p. 246, L. 18 - p. 248, L. 16.) Lori wrote down the license number of the car, 
contacted another store employee and learned there had been no saddle sales 
that day, and alerted Mr. Vickers so he could check the trailer. (#34747 Tr., p. 
252, L. 25 - p. 254, L. 2; p. 259, Ls. 10-16.) Mr. Vickers confirmed that the trailer 
had been opened up and two saddles stolen. (#34747 Tr., p. 294, L. 14 - p. 308, 
L. 9.) Security cameras at the store recorded the presence of the car. (#34747 
Tr., p. 308, L. 14 - p. 323, L. 17; State's Exhibit F.) Skunkcap tried to enlist 
Clyde Dixey to sell the stolen saddles. (#34747 Tr., p. 386, L. 23 - p. 396, L. 4.) 
A few days after the theft officers arrested Skunkcap driving the car involved in 
the theft. (#34747 Tr., p. 348, L. 22 - p. 355, L. 16; p. 369, L. 9 - p. 375, L. 25.) 
During the trial the prosecutor elicited testimony from Detective Nelson 
that when he asked Skunkcap for an interview Skunkcap responded, "I'm not 
fucking talking to you guys." (#34747 Tr., p. 405, L. 18 - p. 407, L. 19.) 
Skunkcap did not object to this line of questioning. (Id.) The district court, 
26 
however, specifically instructed the jury that "people have the right[,] if they 
want[,] to not talk to the police, and so I don't want you to hold it against Mr. 
Skunkcap that he wouldn't give a statement." (#34747 Tr., p. 409, Ls. 7-10.) 
Skunkcap neither objected to the testimony nor requested a mistrial after the trial 
court gave its curative instruction. (#34747 Tr., p. 404, L. 14 - p. 412, L. 10.) 
On appeal Skunkcap claims presentation of testimony about the 
attempted interview was fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 60-67.) He 
has failed, however, to show prejudice in light of the district court's instruction 
and the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457,459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
C. Skunkcap Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
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fair tribunaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) 
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for 
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the 
error affected the defendant's sUbstantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court 
proceedings." lit at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Skunkcap has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice. 
Although there is a split among the federal courts on the use of pre-
Miranda silence at trial, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that, because the 
right to silence is always present, it violates a defendant's rights to use his 
silence either before or after Miranda warnings as evidence of his guilt. State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998); see also State v. 
Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290-91, 178 P.3d 644, 655-56 (2007). It is therefore 
error where, as here, the prosecutor presents evidence that the defendant 
invoked his right to silence in response to an attempted police interview. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60-61, 253 P.3d 727, 734-35 (2011). 
Skunkcap has, however, failed to demonstrate that the error probably 
affected the outcome of the trial. First, the evidence of Skunkcap's guilt is 
overwhelming. An eyewitness saw him stealing the saddles; video of the crime 
scene puts the car he was driving at the scene; and he was trying to sell a saddle 
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shortly after the theft. Skunkcap points out that the eyewitness did not identify 
him in a photographic lineup, that his family owned some saddles, and that the 
stolen saddles were never recovered (Appellant's brief, p. 64), but ignores the 
fact that surveillance video and the eyewitness also put the car he was driving at 
the time at the scene of the theft and the attempt to recruit help selling the 
saddle. Even if Skunkcap's challenges to parts of the case against him are 
accepted, the unchallenged evidence still shows that someone matching 
Skunkcap's general description, and driving the car Skunkcap was using at the 
time, stole the saddles very shortly before Skunkcap tried to clandestinely sell a 
saddle. The odds that someone other than Skunkcap stole the saddles are 
vanishingly small. Skunkcap's challenge to the evidence simply does not create 
the type of doubt that he must establish to show a reasonable probability of a 
different result under the fundamental error standard. 
Second, the district court instructed the jury that there is a right to not talk 
to the police and "I don't want you to hold it against Mr. Skunkcap that he 
WOUldn't give a statement." (#34747 Tr., p. 409, Ls. 6-10.) "Error in the 
admission of evidence may be cured by proper instruction, and it must be 
presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's direction to disregard entirely the 
objectional testimony." State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 
1982). Skunkcap claims the instruction was "inadequate as a matter of law" but 
cites to no relevant law in support of that claim. (Appellant's brief, p. 65.) 
Indeed, it is common to give an instruction for juries not to consider a defendant's 
exercise of the right to silence when the jury personally witnesses that exercise 
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when the defendant does not testify at trial. See,~, Gabourie v. State, 125 
Idaho 254, 259-60, 869 P.2d 571, 576-77 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding of no prejudice 
supported by instruction to take no inference from a defendant's silence in claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel for claiming in opening statement that 
defendant would testify). Skunkcap has failed to show that instructions adequate 
to protect a defendant when that defendant invokes his right to silence at trial are 
inadequate to protect a defendant who invoked his right prior to trial. 
In addition, although it was certainly error to elicit testimony that Skunkcap 
had refused to be interviewed by the police, Skunkcap's argument that such was 
prejudicial because there were "over a dozen questions and answers" regarding 
Mr. Skunkcap's invocation of his right to remain silent, each "aggregat[ing]" the 
"prejudicial impact" (Appellant's brief, p. 63-65) can most charitably be called 
hyperbolic. Skunkcap is apparently including questions like "0. And was that in 
an interview room? A Yes, Detective Interview Room A" and "0. Do you see 
that person here in the courtroom today? A Yes I do. O. Would you please point 
him out and describe his clothing? A He is sitting at the defense table, black 
jeans and black checkered shirt" among his "over a dozen questions" 
aggregating prejudice. (#34747 Tr., p. 405, L. 9 - p. 407, L. 19.) 
Evidence of Skunkcap's refusal to be interviewed by the police was 
erroneously admitted, without objection. Skunkcap has the burden of 
demonstrating from the record a reasonable probability that this error changed 
the outcome of his trial. Because the district court instructed the jury about the 
right to not give a statement and that Skunkcap's exercise of that right should not 
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be held against him, and because the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming, 
Skunkcap has failed to show that the error rises to the level of prejudice required 
under fundamental error review. 
VIII. 
Skunkcap's Argument That The District Court Failed To Understand It Had 
Discretion To Run The Enhanced Eluding Sentence Concurrently Is Based On A 
Misrepresentation Of The Record 
Skunkcap was allowed to withdraw his plea to the persistent violator 
enhancement in docket number 34746. (#38249 R, pp. 1-20, 24-25.) After 
Skunkcap was again convicted of being a persistent violator (#38249 R, pp. 107-
12), the court entered judgment sentencing Skunkcap on the newly tried 
enhancement only (#38249 R, pp. 114-16). Skunkcap filed a Rule 35 motion 
claiming that the new sentence on the enhancement only was illegal because the 
sentence for the enhanced eluding conviction was necessarily vacated upon 
granting the motion to withdraw the plea to the enhancement and also requesting 
that the court exercise its discretion and reduce the sentence. (#38249 R, pp. 
119-21.) The district court agreed that the entire sentence for the enhanced 
eluding had been vacated and granted the motion in part, denied the request for 
leniency, and reinstated the original eluding sentence. (#38249 R, pp. 134-35; 
#38249 Tr., p. 326, L. 1 - p. 327, L. 19.) 
Skunkcap claims that the district court denied his motion asserting that the 
entire enhanced eluding sentence had been vacated, and therefore did not 
understand it had discretion to reduce that sentence or run it concurrently with 
the sentence for the enhanced grand theft. (Appellant's brief, pp. 56-60.) This 
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argument is supported by, first, claiming that the part of the district court's order 
denying reconsideration is actually the part of the order addressing the claim that 
the court should have addressed the entire enhanced sentence (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 58-59) and, second, citing to the transcript of the sentencing hearing that 
preceded the filing of the motion in question to claim that the court "failed to 
recognize that it had the authority to determine whether this sentence would be 
consecutive or concurrent to his sentence for grand theft" (Appellant's brief, p. 
59 (citing "38249 Tr., p.315, Ls.11-16")). The language in the challenged order 
says exactly the opposite of Skunkcap's appellate claim: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Rule 35 Motion is 
GRANTED in part in that the Court has the ability and will 
reconsider the original sentence on the charge of Eluding in this 
matter along with the sentence on the enhancement charge of 
Persistent Violator. The Court will further reconsider whether to run 
this case concurrent or consecutive to Defendant's other case, CR-
2006-22110-FE. 
(#38249 R., p. 135.) Likewise, the transcript of the relevant hearing also shows 
that the district court understood it had authority to run the sentences 
concurrently if it chose to. (#38249 Tr., p. 326, Ls. 1-11 (district court stated that 
it had read the authority provided by defense counsel and agreed with counsel 
that it had authority to review the eluding sentence and run it concurrently with 
the grand theft).) Skunkcap's argument is premised upon a misrepresentation of 
the record and is therefore without merit. 
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cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments in both 
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